Exonerations from Liability for Damage Caused by Space Activities by Mazaroff, Stanley
Cornell Law Review
Volume 54
Issue 1 November 1968 Article 5
Exonerations from Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Activities
Stanley Mazaroff
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stanley Mazaroff, Exonerations from Liability for Damage Caused by Space Activities , 54 Cornell L. Rev. 71 (1968)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol54/iss1/5
EXONERATIONS FROM LIABILITY FOR
DAMAGE CAUSED BY SPACE
ACTIVITIES
Stanley Mazarofft
Even before the historic 1957 launching of Sputnik I, legal com-
mentators in the then embryonic discipline of space law were engaged
in a scholarly dialogue regarding what legal principles should govern
man's future ventures into space. At a time when most knew of space
exploration only, through the fiction of Verne and Wells, the early
space lawyers were categorizing space vehicles as dangerous instrumen-
talities,' speculating as to the destructive consequences of space activi-
ties, 2 and debating the merits of the principle of strict liability as ap-
plied to damages resulting from space activities3 For instance, in 1955
it was maintained that:
Little imagination is required to visualize the consequences of a
large missile, carrying many tons of propulsive fuel, landing in a
t Member of the Maryland Bar. B.A. 1960, LL.B. 1965, University of Maryland. This
article is based on a paper submitted in partial fulfillment of the LL.M. requirements at
the George Washington Law Center.
1 Meyer, Legal Problems of Flight into the Outer Space, Address before Third
Internat. Astronautical Cong., Stuttgart (1952), in SENATE Commrrrn ON AERONAurICAL
AND SPACE SCIENCES, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF SPACE ExPLORATION-A SYMPOsIuM, S. Doc. No. 26,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 14 (1961) [hereinafter cited as SYMPOSIUM]. See generally L. LIPSON
& N. KATzENBACH, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 82 (1961).
2E.g., Wright, Remarks at Proceedings of the American Soc. of Int'l Law (1956), in
SymPosIum, supra note 1, at 85. Professor Wright queried whether the United States is
bound to pay damages if one of its space vehicles crashes into Westminster Abbey.
3 V. MANDL, DAS WELTRAUMREc-T: EiN PROBLEM DER RAUMFAHRT (1932), abstracted in
L. LIPsON & N. KATZENBACH, supra note 1, at 81, abst. no. 411. Professor Mandl main-
tained that owners and drivers of space vehicles will be subject to absolute liability,
without any ceiling as to the extent, toward all persons and things damaged by the
spacecraft in the absence of any contractual relationship. Professor Jenks has written that
activities in space should be made subject to "rules concerning liability for injury or
damage to persons or property on the ground resulting from activities in space, analogous
to the provisions of the Rome Convention of 1952 on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft
to Third Parties on the Surface." Jenks, International Law and Activities in Space, 9
INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 99 (1956), in SyMposIuM, supra note 1, at 33, 38 (footnote omitted).
The Rome Convention of 1952, reprinted in 19 J. AIR L. & CoM. 447 (1952), applies the
principle of strict liability. Contrary to the position taken by Professors Mandl and Jenks,
Professor McDougal has said, "If the purposes here [of space activity] are so advantageous
that everybody wants to secure them, then Rylands v. Fletcher will not be the answer.
There will not be absolute liability. Reasonableness will be the key to decision." Mc-
Dougal, Remarks at Proceedings of the Amer. Soc. of Int'l Law (1956), in SYMPOsiUM,
supra note 1, at 86, 87.
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large town, a seaport, or village, meeting an air-liner in flight or
colliding with ai ocean-going liner.4
The speculations voiced in the pre-space age With respect to the
risks inherent in space vehicle excursions now appear quite credible.
At last count there were close to 800 satellites ringing the globe.5
Moreover, to determine the total quantum of man-made objects in
space, decayed objects and fragments once part of single launches
must be included. For example, 268 objects have been identified as
debris associated with the 1965 launching of Titan 82A. 6 Further-
more, by 1975 there may be up to 50,000 additional satellites in
space.7 Thus, it ig no surprise that scientists have for some time been
concerned with the possibility of a traffic jam in outer space.8 The
growing number of man-made objects that will remain in space for
periods ranging up to thousands of years threatens not only future
spacecraft navigation,9 but also, and more probably, third persons
and property in the air and on the ground.
The possibility of harm resulting from space activities was dram-
atized on September 5, 1962 when a twenty-pound object, later iden-
tified as a fragment of Sputnik IV, fell on a street in Manitowac, Wis-
consin. A number of other fragments of the satellite fell into nearby
Lake Michigan. Although no damage resultedi the possibility of harm
to persons on the ground was evident.' The incident at Manitowac,
although theatrical, was neither unprecedented nor unrep&ated-space
objects had crashed to earth before, and they continue to do so today.1
4 Hester, Some Political Implications of Space-Flight, J, BaTrr. INTEpLANETAPY SOO.
314 (1955), in SymposiuM, supra note 1, at 27, 29.
5 See NASA, 7 Satellite Situation Rep. No. 20 (Oct. $1, 1967).
6 Id. at 28,
7 Beresford, A Program to Control Civil Liability for Spacecraft Accidents 2 (Ameri-
can Rocket Soc, Reprint No. 1522-60, 1960).
8 See, eg,, A Traffic Jam in Outer Space? Something New tO Worry About, U.S. Naws
& WoaPu REa, May 2, 198, at 56.
9 Hall, Comments on Sa1vqge and Removal of Man-Made Objects from Outer Space,
33 J. AiR L, $c Coat, 208, 295 (1967). Hall tells us that space congestion is possible because,
"Although outer space is infinite
, 
most space traffic about the earth is concentrated in a
zone below or in the reaches of the Tadiaola belts (from 100 to 400 miles), in a torus
embracing all polar orbits, and in a torus encompassing all low-inclination orbits." Id.
at 288 n.1,
10 Sge U.N. Doc. A/AC,105/PV. 15, 33,34 (1962), At a meeting of the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of OPuter Space, the United States representative, Mr.Plimpton, placed the Manitowac fragment before the Soviet Union's representatve and
stated that although no damage had been done, the possibility of harm was evident, Id.
11 In September, 1960, a section of whAt was presumably Pioneer VI, an unsuccesful
United States moon probe, landed on a Solth African farm. See Beresf0rd, supra note 7,
at 1. An Agena-Atias Rocket orbited by the United States from the West Coast retuimed at
[Vol. 54:71
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Recent studies indicate that space activities might occasion disas-
trous consequences should a space vehicle malfunction and go astray
at or within a short time after launch.12 Such an errant space vehicle,
with most of its highly volatile fuel unexpended, could crash into a city
located within a fairly small radius of the launch site.'8 The possibility
of such a catastrophe was vividly described years ago:
The force of its impact could crush a building or any other object
in its way, Its heat could cause burns and ignite inflammable
materials over a wide area. The resulting damage might resemble
the devastation left by a meteor. Certain kinds of spacecraft
could produce even greater hazards-ifor example, by releasing
radioactive material from a nuclear engine,' 4
This is not to indicate that the risk of occasional and serious dam-
age caused by spacecraft is great or even probable.' 5 To date there has
not been a single formal international claim based on injuries or dam-
ages resulting from activities in space. Nevertheless, the risk, however
minimal, is there and we should be cognizant of it. As Professors Lay
and Taubenfeld recently stated:
least 40 fragments to earth over a seven-day period. Chicago Tribune, March 11, 1966, at 24,
col. 3. For a list of U.S. and kussian satellites, lunar, and space probes that irregularly
returned to earth from 1957 to 1960, see SYmPosiuM, supra note 1, at 1305-28. Fragments
reportedly have fallen to earth in rural areas in Brazil, Cuba, Mexico, and Peru. On
March 3, 1968, the reentry of Zond 4, a Soviet space vehicle, was witnessed by numerous
persons in Indiana, Ohio, and Tennessee. Although no wreckage has been found, the
Air Force believes that the surviving fragments fell near the Pennsylvania-New York
border. N.Y. Times, July 2, 1968, at 1, col. 2. Sep also NEwswEEK, July 15, 1908, at 48.
12 Lay & Taubenfeld, Liability and Space Activities: Causes, Objectives and Parties,
6 VA. J. INTL L. 252, 256 (1966). See generally A. ROsENtHAL, H. KoaRN & S. LUBMAN,
CATASTROPHIC Acctmr4Ts IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS (1963); Arthur D. Little, Inc., Credible
Catastrophic Eventualities in Selected Areas of Government Spoftsored Activities, and
Hassialis, Bernstein & O'Neill, Some Major Hazards in Government Sponsored Activities, in
REPORT TO LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING RESEARCH FUND, COLUMBIA UNIVERsIT (1964).
13 Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of International
Law, 14 INT'L & Comp'. L.Q. 1189, 1194 (1965).
14 Beresford, Liability for Ground Damage Caused by Spacecraft, 19 FEo. B.J. 242
(1959), in SYMPOsium, supra note 1, at 540.
1 ProfesSor Vazquez maintains that
The threat that space navigation poses to all countries in the world has been
greatly exaggerated. Undoubtedly certain dangers exist, but we do not believe
that they are any greater than those posed by aviation, and no one is frightened
by these.
M. SEARA VAZQUgZ, CO IC INTERNATIONAL LAw 114 (1965).
On the lighter side is the anecdote about the British citizen who, just prior to the
launching of the first United States lunar probe, informed the President that he had
claimed a certain section of one of the craters on the moon and intended to hold the
United States responsible for any damage to his property. See P. JE=sUV & H. TAUBENFELD,
CONTROLS FOR OuTa SPACE 241 (1959).
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As the number of objects put into outer space increases, the prob-
ability of damage from falling debris correspondingly increases
even though ... the incidence of damage is likely, to continue to
be quite low. 1
Professor Goldie has struck a similar note:
Accidents on this [catastrophic] scale may not happen with
any frequency, or great probability, but the possibility that they
may happen is peril enough and should be provided against.17
Thus, there is a real possibility of personal injury and destruction
resulting from space activities. Moreover, there are important interna-
tional legal implications of such damage.' 8
The multifaceted and complex question of liability for injury or
damage caused by space vehicle accidents has been discussed for the
past eight years at international colloquies on the law of outer space.
Over practically the same period, national representatives, operating
through the Legal Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, have discussed proposals for an inter-
national agreement concerning liability for damage caused by the
launching of objects into outer space.19 Almost from the start, there
has been general agreement that the principle of strict liability20
should apply in cases where damage is caused on the surface of the
16 Lay & Taubenfeld, supra note 12, at 255 (footnote omitted).
17 Goldie, supra note 13, at 1194 (footnote omitted).
18 For example, even the fall of objects from space might have serious international
repercussions. Latchford, Bearing of International Air Navigation Conventions on the
Use of Outer Space, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 405, 410 (1959). Vazquez argues that even if no
physical, damage is caused by a fallen space object, there has nevertheless been a technical
violation of Art. 8 of ihe Chicago Convention of 1944 [Interim Agreement Respecting
International Civil Aviation, opened for signature December 7, 1944, 59 Stat. 1516, E.A.S.
No. 469 (1945)] and such a transgression could call for reparations. M. SARA VAzQuEZ,
supra note 15, at 119.
19 See Dembling & Arons, Space Law and the United Nations: The Work of the Legal
Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 32
J. AnR L. & Com. 329 (1966). See generally SENATE COMM. ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE
SCIENCES, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ORGANIZATION FOR OUTER SPACE, S. Doc. No. 56,
89th Cong., Ist Sess. (1965).
20 The term strict liability will be used in this paper to, mean liability attaching
upon proof of only a causal connection between the object put in motion by the party
against whom a claim is made and the injury suffered by the claimant. The term as used
herein also implies the availability of certain exonerations from liability. When no
exoneration from liability is contemplated, the term absolute liability will be used. Many
consider the terms strict liability, absolute liability, and liability without fault interchange.
able. Others strictly eschew this.interchange. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS §§ 56, 60
(2d ed. 1955). For a good discussion regarding the differences among the three terms, see
Goldie, supra note 13, at 1196-1220.
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Earth and in the air.21 And today there appears to be unanimous
support for this doctrine.
Assuming that liability for space accidents will be founded upon
the principle of strict liability, a host of ancillary legal problems in
need of careful consideration arises. This article explores one of these
problems: What, if any, exonerations from the principle of strict li-
ability should be included in an international convention on liabil-
ity for damage caused by space activities?
I
DOMESTIC LAW
A. Anglo-American Development of Strict Liability
The early law of torts in the Anglo-American legal system was
not so much concerned with the fault of the actor as with the loss
to the injured party.22 The jurisprudential underpinnings of liability
changed course, however, and until the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury the law of torts progressively moved away from causation liabil-
ity and toward the recognition of fault or moral responsibility as the
basis for restitution. Notable exceptions were made, of course, the
most prominent of which was the oft-cited case of Rylands v. Flet-
cher23 which imposed liability when one damaged another by an ac-
21 See, e.g., Cooper, Memorandum of Suggestions for an International Convention on
Third Party Damage by Space Vehicles, in THiRD COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE
141 (A. Haley & K. Gronfors eds. 1960); Haley, Space Vehicle Torts, 36 U. DET. L.J. 294,
296 (1959); Rode-Verschoor, The Responsibility of States for the Damage Caused by
Launched Space Bodies, in FIRsT COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUm SPACE 103 (A. Haley
& W. Hanover eds. 1958); note 3 supra. The United Nations Legal Subcommittee appears
to have adopted the position of strict liability sub silentio by its second session in April
and May of 1963. See Dembling & Arons, supra note 19, at 336. But see Beresford, supra
note 14, at 252, in SYmaposium, supra note 1, at 550. Beresford argues that the prevailing view
in 1959 among delegates to the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space was that liability for damage caused by spacecraft should be based on fault.
22 For a good, concise historical development of the law of liability, see W. PRossER,
LAW OF ToRTs § 74 (3d ed. 1964).
23 L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866), aff'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). Rylands v. Fletcher has been
accepted by leading American authorities. See, e.g., W. PROssER, supra note 22, at 527;
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, ToRTs § 145, at 811, 812 (1956). Although it has been followed
in about twenty American states, it has been explicitly rejected in eleven. In the words
of Justice Blackburn, the rule is:
We think that the true rule of law is that the person who for his own purposes
brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it
escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and if he does not do so, is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.
L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866).
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tivity which was inappropriate or non-natural to the place where it
was undertaken. Although Rylands v. Fletcher rejuvenated the prin-
ciple of strict liability, certain exonerations and exceptions were pro-
vided. For instance, the defendant in that case, whose defective res-
ervoir allowed water to enter the plaintiff's mine, would have been
relieved of liability by showing that the event was caused by an act
of God, which was understood to mean an unforeseeable, intervening
force of nature. A deliberate intervening act of a stranger also would
have constituted an exoneration.
The twentieth century has witnessed the development of entirely
new fields of liability based upon the premise that he who creates a
risk must be responsible for its consequences. Industrial enterprises
involving unusual conditions or activities have been held liable for
damage caused by reasonable conduct on the ground that society is
best served if the enterprise is made to account for the loss that it
inflicts. The philosophy underlying this trend has been couched in
terms of social economics, social engineering, or social justice. It has
been maintained that as a matter of social policy, damages resulting
from industrial activities should be considered part of the general cost
of the activity because the enterprise is able to assess, administer, and
insure against the risk by passing on the loss to the public. In this
way the prospective costs of the risk are allocated in a manner that
entails the least hardship upon any single individual.2 Similarly,
when industrial activities result in an accident where neither party
is to blame, the relevant inquiry should be: Who can best bear the
loss in view of the exigencies of social justice? In response to this
query, the loss should be shifted by creating liability where there
has been no fault.25
Another theory, applicable only to tortious conduct by the gov-
ernment, has found expression in a few American cases. 26 The "ex-
propriation theory," 27 is based upon the principle that the govern-
ment may not force an individual to bear a public burden without
just compensation when his private property has been taken, though
accidentally, as a consequence of a public purpose.
The prevailing American view is that the traditional exonera-
tions still obtain in cases applying the doctrine of strict liability, since
24 See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 23, at 787. See also H. DRION, LIMITATIONS
OF LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AI LAiw 11-12 (1954).
25 W. PROSSER, supra note 20, § 56, at 317.
26 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 828 U.S. 256 (1946); United States v. Lynah,
188 U.S. 445 (1003).
27 See Goldie, supra note 13, at 1212-14.
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an unqualified principle of strict liability imposes too heavy a bur-
den on the defendant, Prosser observes, "It is one thing to say that a
dangerous enterprise must pay its way within reasonable limits, and
quite another to say that it must bear responsibility for every extreme
of harm that it may cause." s28 The most important exonerations from
strict liability in the United States are: act of God; independent,
unforeseeable act of a third party which could not be prevented; as-
sumption of risk; and wanton, willful, or reckless misconduct which
materially increases the probability of injury."
B. European Development of Strict Liability
The principle of strict liability was not unknown to the law of
torts as it developed on the European mainland. 0 In the last quarter
of the nineteenth century, German jurists maintained that since the
activities of certain industries were inevitably dangerous to third per-
sons, such enterprises should be held strictly liable.31 That compensa-
tion should be imposed on those who, according to social justice or
economics, are most suitably positioned to divide the loss over the
widest sector of society was one rationale for this approach.8 2 Strict li-
ability was first applied to the railway industry by the Prussians. Un-
der their law, contributory negligence and uiiavoidable accident were
considered ineffective defenses. In 1871, Germany adopted the Prus-
sian rule and many other nations followed suit. 3  The principle was
also applied to other industries. The Swiss in 1902 imposed strict li-
ability upon electrical enterprises and established vis major, fault or
conduct of a third person, and gross negligence of the person harmed
as grounds for exoneration.m 4 The Prussians and Austrians later ap-
28 W. PRossER, supra note 20, § 60, at 338.
20 Id. at 338-44.
30 See generally Takayanagi, Liability Without Fault in the Modern Civil and Com-
mon Law, 16 ILL L. REv. 163 (Part 1), 268 (Part I1) (1921), 17 IT.L. L. RV. 416 (Part IV)
(1922). Becker, however, states that the problem of liability for injury is compounded
by the divergent systems of jurisprudence. Under the Napoleonic Code, which exerted a
strong influence on Germanic and Latin American jurisprudence, liability without fault
is not looked on favorably, while in the United States the contrary prevails. Becker, The
Lawyer and the New Dimension of Space, INTER-AMERiCAN BAR AssocATION, ErUVmrrsH
CONFEReNCE (Miami, 1959); L. iP8ON & N. K ATENBACH, supra note 1, abst. 419. See also
H. DRION, supra note 24, at 148 n.1. Drion says the principle of strict liability is known
to the legal systems of France, Egypt, Italy, Lebanon, Venezuela, Hungary, Mexico, and
Norway. The list does not by any means appear to be exhaustive.
31 Takayanagi, supra note 30, 16 ILL. L. REV. at 168.
32 Id., 17 ILi.. L. REv. at 421.
33 Austria, Hungary, Switzerland, Holland, Russia, Sweden, and Belgium were among
that group. Id., 16 ILL. L. REv. at 270-71,
34 Id. at 273.
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plied the doctrine to mining.3 5 Hungary applied it, with the exoner-
ation of vis major, to explosives.3 6 Also, European nations have long
applied strict liability principles in cases involving automobile acci-
dents37
C. Strict Liability in the U.S.S.R.
The Soviet Code establishes a principle of strict liability that is
both broader and more rigid than the doctrine applied in Anglo-
American courts.38 Soviet law imposes liability for injury caused by
organizations or citizens whose activities involve "increased danger"
to those in the area of the activity.39 Transport organizations, pro-
duction enterprises, builders, and possessors of automobiles are sub-
ject to such liability.40
The Soviets provide only three exonerations under their law
of strict liability: irresistible force, the intent of the injured party,
and gross negligence of the injured party.41 The defense of irresisti-
ble force has not been treated liberally by the Soviet courts, and con-
sequently it is but rarely encountered in practice.42 Furthermore, the
courts have held that the intervening wrongdoing by a third party is
not an irresistible force and is therefore not a valid exoneration. 43
D. Strict Liability and Aviation Law
Unlike other Soviet industries creating an "increased danger,"
the aviation industry is not afforded the exoneration of irresistible
force or force majeure.44 The defenses of intent or gross negligence
35 Id.
36 Id. at 282.
37 Id. at 277-79. See W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at 542.
38 See Gray, Soviet Tort Law: The New Principles Annotated, 1964 U. ILL. L.F. 180,
183-99.
39 Organizations and citizens whose activity involves increased danger to those
in the vicinity (transport organizations, production enterprises, builders, possessors
of automobiles, and the like) are required to compensate for injury caused by the
source of increased danger, unless, they show that the injury arose as a result of
irresistible force or the intent of the injured party.
U.S.S.R. GRAHz. KOD. (Civil Code) art. 90 (1962). The defense of gross negligence applies
through another section. Article 90 is substantially the same as R.S.F.S.R. GRAZM KOD.
(Civil Code) art. 454 (1964).
40 Id.
41 Gray, supra note 38, at 199.
42 Id. at 199 n.93.
43 Id.
44 See Crane, Soviet Attitude Toward International Space Law, 56 Am. J. INT'L L.
685, 706-10 (1962); Beresford, supra note 14, at 253, in SYMPostuM, supra note 1, at 551.
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of the injured party, however, are available. Thus, the Air Code of
the Soviet Union imposes liability on air carriers for damage to third
persons and property in all cases where it is not proved that the dam-
age has been the result of willful or gross negligence on the part of
the victim. 45
The prevailing view in the United States, however, is that air-
craft flight is not an extrahazardous activity and does not give rise to
strict liability for damages. Although the principle of strict liability
was widely applied to early aircraft accidents, liability in the United
States is presently principally based, upon fault. The principle of
law set forth in the Uniform Aeronautics Act reflected in large
measure the mode of legal thought in earlier times. Under section
5 of this Act, the owner of an aircraft was held strictly liable for
damage resulting from an aviation accident unless the damage was
caused in whole or in part by the negligence of the person injured
or of the owner or bailee of the property injured.46 Between 1920
and 1930, twenty-one states and territories adopted the Uniform Aer-
onautics Act, with many other states applying the Act judicially.47
The American Law Institute, in 1938, adopted the view of the
Uniform Aeronautics Act, citing aviation as a prominent example of
an ultrahazardous activity and calling for the imposition of strict li-
ability. In the Comments to the Restatement, the Institute said:
[A]viation in its present stage of development is ultrahazardous
because even the best constructed and maintained aeroplane is so
incapable of complete control that flying creates a risk that the
plane even though carefully constructed, maintained and operated,
may crash to the injury of persons, structures and chattels on the
land over which the flight is made.48
Under both the Restatement and Uniform Aeronautics Act the only
exoneration available to aircraft was the negligence of the person in-
jured.
As technological progress made air accidents less a result of dan-
gerous instrumentality than a product of human error, there was a
drift away from strict liability.49 Of the twenty-one states that origi-
45 U.S.S.R. Am CODE art. 101 (1962).
46 UNIFORM AERONAUTICS AcT § 5. The Act was promulgated by the Commissioners
on Uniform Laws in 1922 and withdrawn in 1943.
47 See A. HALEY, SPACE LAw AND GOVERNMENT 239 (1963).
48 RE rATEMENT OF ToRTS § 520, comment b (1938).
49 A. HALEY, supra note 47, at 239. But.see W. PRossER, supra note 22, § 77, at 532.
Prosser states: "One possible suggestion as to the ultimate outcome is that strict liability
might be retained as to what may be called 'abnormal' aviation .... "
1968]
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nally adopted the strict liability section of the Uniform Aeronautics
Act, al but six have abandoned this position.50
Although few American courts now apply a strict liability stan-
dard to damage caused by aircraft, it was quite recently applied in
cases involving the test firing of rockets. 51 In these cases the courts
have found that such activities fit the Restatement's test for an ultra-
hazardous activity. Although the law of the United States (or for that
matter the law of any other nation) has not imposed strict liability
for space activities, the rocket cases represent a giant step in that
direction.52 And, if courts should apply the Restatement's standards,
space activities that produce damage to others will be afforded little
in the way of exoneration.53
II
THE PUBLICISTS
Haley,54 Cooper,55 Beresford,50 Taubenfeld, 7 McDougal, 58 and
Jenks59 consider present space activities ultrahazardous and maintain
that a policy of strict liability should or will be applied by the inter-
national community in a multilateral agreement. These commentators
often cite the Rome Convention of 1952, which applied the principle
of strict liability to aircraft causing damage to persons or property on
the ground, as the international agreement most relevant to space age
problems.60 Moreover, some would extend the application of the
Rome principle to cover in-flight damage to persons and property.61
50 See Haley, supra note 21, at 298,
51 Smith v. Lockheed Propulsion Co., 247 Cal. App. 2d 774, 56 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1967);
Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., 37 N.J. 396, 181 A.2d 487 (1962).
52 See Lay & Poole, Exclusive Governmental Liability for Space Law, 53 A.B.A.J. 831
(1967). Lay and Poole argue that the government should compensate for loss arising out
of space activities subject only to the exoneration of contributory negligence.
53 See REsrATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 519-22 (1938).
54 A. HALEY, supra note 47, at 263.
55 Cooper, supra note 21, at 141-44.
56 Beresford, supra note 14, at 245, in SYmpOsiuM, supra note 1, at 543.
57 p. JESSUP & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 15, at 243.
58 M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLAsio, LAIV AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 615, 616
(1963).
59 C. JENKS, SPACE LAW 172 (1965).
60 See pp. 83-84 & note 72 infra. See also, e.g., M. McDouoAL, H. LAsswELL & I. VLASIO,
supra note 58, at 608; Cooper, supra note 21, at 143: Rode-Verschoor, supra note 21, at
103; Schrader, Space Activities and Resulting Tort Liability, 17 OKLA. L. Rxv. 139, 141
(1964); Scifoni, Responsibility for Damage to Space Activities, in NINTH COLLOQUIUM ON
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 104 (M. Schwartz ed. 1966).
61 See, e.g., Cooper, Discussion, THIRD COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAw OF OUTER SPACE 134
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According to Professor McDougal, the underlying concept of the
Rome Convention is that:
[S]ince the injured party on the ground has neither relationship
with, nor control over, the aircraft activities, the burden of loss
should be imposed upon the operator of the aircraft for whose im-
mediate benefit the flight giving rise to damage has been under-
taken.62
This rationale appears just as conceptually basic to an agreement on
space liability. More fundamental theories, such as the social justice
and social economic theories discussed above, have also been set forth
by prominent space lawyers in support of the imposition of strict li-
ability.63
Aside from the theoretical arguments, the commentators point to
some very practical considerations which necessitate the application of
strict liability. Simply stated, without the doctrine of strict liability,
persons suffering damage on the surface or in the air will find it ex-
tremely difficult to prove the source of the damage. This is so because
of the complexity of the mechanism of the space vehicle and the un-
likely existence of any evidence after its fiery descent and collision. As
Beresford puts it:
In spacecraft cases especially, proof of negligence is apt to be very
difficult. Not only is the necessary evidence likely to be complex
and technical, but it may be known only to the Government, and
protected by rules of military security.64
In the same vein, McDougal states that without strict liability, "vir-
tually insurmountable obstacles to recovery might be placed upon
those suffering deprivation . ... 65
There is widespread recognition that negligence on the part of
the claimant is an acceptable exoneration.66 As an extreme example
of this, Jenks pictures an aircraft flying near a launching site with-
(A. Haley 8: K. Gronfors eds. 1961). But cf. Beresford, id, at 135-36. Beresford argues that
equal liability should be applied for damage in space, on the surface, or in the air.
62 Mi. MCDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLAsio, supra note 58, at 607.
63 See, e.g., C. JENKS, supra note 59, at 172-73.
64 Beresford, supra note 14, at 250, in SYMPosIUM, supra note 1, at 548. See also Haley,
supra note 21, at 299-300; Mankiewicz, The Regulation of Aeronautical Space and Some
Related Problems, 8 McGiL. L.J. 193, 209 (1962).
65 M. MCDOUGALj H. LASSWELI, & I, VLASIo, supra note 58, at 615.
66 See, e.g., D, GOEDHUIS, CONFLIcTs OF LAW AND DIVERGENCIES IN THE LEGAL REGIME
OF AIR AND OUTER SPACE (1963). Those who would apply the exoneration formula of the
Rome Convention of 1952 implicitly maintain that contributory negligence should be an
exoneration under a space liability treaty.
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out warning or at a time when launching has been announced or may
be reasonably expected.67
McDougal feels that the trend in international agreements on li-
ability is to narrow the scope of available exonerations. He notes that
although act of God has been traditionally, recognized as a legitimate
exoneration, it has found no place in the recent treaties. He says that
the permitted defenses now ordinarily include only major catastrophe
(not to be confused with force majeure or act of God), war and civil
disturbance. McDougal also notes that substantial difficulty will ex-
ist in obtaining evidence pertinent to the issue of act of God or con-
tributory negligence as a result of surface impact.68
A further sampling of opinion discloses that others agree that
force majeure should not be included as an exoneration in a space li-
ability treaty. 69 It is particularly important that support for this view
can be found within the ranks of communist publicists3 0 Finally,
there has been recent and well-articulated argument that no exoner-
ations whatsoever should obtain for ground damage.71
The trends detected from this sampling of legal opinion in regard
to exonerations from liability in a space treaty might be summarized
as follows:
1. As a very practical reason for invoking strict liability, the space
lawyers point to the insurmountable task that would befall a claimant
should he be required to marshall facts either destroyed by impact or
of a highly technical and perhaps secretive nature. This reasoning mil-
itates equally in favor of avoiding certain exonerations-for example,
force majeure, which would entail equally difficult problems of proof.
67 C. JENKs, supra note 59, at 286-87.
68 M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLASIO, supra note 58, at 617.
69 See Aranjo, Discussion, NINrn COLLOqUIUM ON THE LAw OF OUTRr SPACE 107 (M.
Schwartz ed. 1966). Those who hold that the principles of the Rome Convention of 1952
should apply to a convention on space liability impliedly assert that force majeure should
not obtain since this exoneration is not found in the Rome agreement. But cf. Rode-
Verschoor, supra note 21, at 103. Rode-Verschoor states that a nation might be allowed
to exclude responsibility in a case of force majeure, as when a meteor collides with a
spaceship.
70 See Csabafi, Selected Chapters from Space Law in the MakinglIV[: Space Legal
Liability, in EIGHTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAw OF OtrrER SPACE 103, 110-11 (A. Haley & M.
Schwartz eds. 1965); Herczeg, Some Legal Problems of Liability in Connection with Outer-
Space Activities, id. at 229.
71 See generally Goldie, supra note 13. Professor Goldie argues that the degree of
responsibility for damage by spacecraft should vary with the situation, which includes
not only the location of the accident but also the value of the space operation and the
activities of the parties involved. In this regard, he proposes four separate regimes of
liability, one of which is absolute liability (unqualified by exonerations) for damage on the
earth's surface. Id. at 1220-24.
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This is particularly relevant if the state, as the claimant, or represent-
ing the true claimant or claimants, is technologically undeveloped.
2. Most space lawyers disfavor the application of the traditional
exonerations, such as force majeure, from liability in a space liability
agreement. On the other hand, most accept the exoneration of negli-
gence on the part of the claimant.
III
ANALOGUES
A seriatim examination of the exoneration provisions of the
Rome Convention of 1952, the Paris Nuclear Liability Convention,
the Brussels Convention on Nuclear Ships, and the Vienna Nuclear
Liability Convention are helpful in determining the prospective lia-
bility provisions of an agreement on liability for damage caused by
space activities.
A. The Rome Convention of 1952
The purpose of this agreement, as stated in its preamble, is "to
ensure adequate compensation for persons who suffer damage caused on
the surface by foreign aircraft, ' 72 and, at the same time, to protect
international air transportation by reasonably limiting the extent of
liability. According to Professor Verplaetse, the Convention was, in
part, designed to provide "a rigorous protection for unforeseen risks
with regard to the victim. s7 3 The Convention has been mentioned
more than any other agreement as a prime source of precedent for a
space liability agreement.7 4 In fact, some have suggested that the Rome
Convention should be modified to directly cover damage caused by
spacecraft.7 5 Also deserving of note is the fact that in its report of June
12, 1959, the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space specifically suggested that the future framers of a space
liability convention take into account this Convention.7 6
Article I of the Convention calls for the application of the prin-
ciple of strict liability. To establish liability under this article, the
72 Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the
Surface, Rome, Oct. 7, 1952. The text of the Convention is reprinted in 19 J. Am L. &
CoM. 447 (1952).
73 J. VERPLA-sE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN VERTICAL SPACE 363 (1960).
74 See pp. 80-83 supra.
75 See Verplaetse, Conflicts of Air and Outer Space Law, in THIRD COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OuTER SPACE 145, 148 (A. Haley & K. Gronfors eds. 1960).
76 U.N. Doc. A/AC/98/2 at 4 (1959). See also U.N. Doc. A/AC/98/SR 4 at 9(1959).
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claimant need only prove that his damage was caused by an aircraft
in flight or by any person or thing falling therefrom17 Article IX
qualifies article I by providing that article I applies only to a non-
deliberate act or omission.18
Articles V and VI set forth the exonerations. Article V provides
that there shall be no liability if the damage was the "direct conse-
quence of armed conflict or civil disturbance, or if such person has
been deprived of the use of the aircraft by act of public authority."79
Article VI provides that there shall be no liability if the damage was
caused "solely through the negligence or other wrongful act or omis-
sion of the person who suffers the damage or of the latter's servants or
agents [not] . . . acting outside the scope of his authority." In this
regard, the compensation is to be reduced to the extent to which such
negligence contributed to the damage.80
In regard to the exonerations, every effort by delegates to the
Convention to enlarge the number of exonerations was defeated by a
substantial margin.8' In addition, it has been reported that:
The Conference would not accept even a provision to relieve an
operator of liability where the damage was the direct consequence
of the deliberate act of a third person done with intent to cause
damage which the operator could not reasonably have foreseen or
prevented. This is illustrative of the single-mindedness with which
the Conference adhered to the principle of absolute liability... .82
The exoneration of force majeure was not made available.83
B. The Paris Nuclear Liability Convention of 196084
Based upon the principle that he who creates a source of danger by
employing a certain instrument assumes the obligation to the com-
munity that nobody shall suffer damage from it,85 this regional mul-
77 19 J. Am L. & CoM. at 447.
78 Id. at 449.
79 Id. at 448,
80 Id.
81 Summary Analysts of Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third
Persons on the Surface-Annex to Delegation Report, 20 J. AIR L. & Com. 92, 94-95 (1953).
82Id. at 94.
83 See Calkins, Principles and Extent of Liability Under the Revision of the Rome
Convention-Proposed by the ICAO Legal Committee, 17 J. Am L. & Com. 151, 164-66
(1950).
84 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Paris, July 29,
1960, reprinted in 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 1082 (1961).
85 See Rode-Verschoor, Observations on Comparing the Responsibility for Damage
Caused by Spacecraft and that Caused by Nuclear Installation and Nuclear Powered Ships,
in FOURTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OuTER SPAcE 329 (A. Haley & M. Schwartz eds.
1961).
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tilateral agreement, signed in July, 1960, was the first on liability in the
field of nuclear energy. The Convention is aimed at damage that might
be caused by the release of radioactive materials from nuclear facili-
ties.86 Similar to the Rome Convention of 1952, its basic objectives
are: (1) to assure adequate and equitable compensation to persons
who suffer damage as a consequence of nuclear incident; and (2) to en-
able suppliers and operators to predict the extent of their potential
liability and thereby take appropriate steps to protect themselves fi-
nancially8 7
Article III of the Convention provides for liability solely upon
proof of causation88 and article IX sets forth the available exoner-
ations from strict liability. Article IX states:
Except insofar as national legislation may provide to the contrary,
the operator shall not be liable for damage caused by a nuclear
incident due to an act of armed conflict, invasion civil war, insur-
rection, or a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character.8 9
The issue of exonerations under the treaty is elucidated by para-
graph 48 of the Expos6 des motifs. Because it so well explains the views
of the Convention delegates, it is set forth in full:
The absolute liability of the operator is not subject to the
classic exonerations such as force majeure, Acts of God or interven-
ing acts of third persons, whether or not such acts were reasonably
foreseeable and avoidable. In so far as any precaution can be taken,
those in charge of a nuclear installation are in a position to take
them, whereas potential victims have no way of protecting them-
selves.
The only exonerations lie in the case of damage caused by a
nuclear incident directly due to certain disturbances of an interna-
tional character such as acts of armed conflict and hostilities, of a
political nature such as civil war and insurrection, or grave natural
disasters of an exceptional character, which are catastrophic and
completely unforeseeable, on the grounds that all such matters are
the responsibility of the nation as a whole. No other exonerations
are permitted. The national legislation of the operator liable may,
however, provide that he is to be liable even in the case of a grave
natural disaster of an exceptional character [Article 9].
Where the incident or damage is caused wholly or partly by
the person suffering damage, it will be for the competent court, in
86 Bermand & Hydeman, A Convention on Third Party Liability for Damage from
Nuclear Incidents, 55 Am. J. INT'L L. 966 (1961).
87 id.
88 55 Am. J. INT'L L. at 1084.
89 Id. at 1089.
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accordance with national law, to decide the effect of such negli-
gence upon the claim for compensation.90
C. The Brussels Convention of 1962 on Nuclear Ships91
The main objective of this Convention, like that of the Paris Nu-
clear Liability Convention, is to give potential claimants adequate finan-
cial protection against nuclear risks without exposing operators to an
unreasonable level of liability.92 Professor McDougal believes that this
agreement is even more relevant than the Paris Nuclear Liability Con-
vention to the problems raised by spacecraft. He states: "[N]o decision-
maker attempting to regulate the problem of surface damage by space-
craft will be able to ignore the principles it enunciates." 93
Article II(1) of the Convention states that a nuclear ship shall be
absolutely liable for any nuclear damage upon proof of causation. 94
Article 11(5) and article VII establish the exonerations. Article 11(5)
provides that the operator may be exonerated wholly or partially from
his liability upon proof that "the nuclear damage resulted wholly or
partially from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage
by the individual who suffered the damage." 95 Article VIII exonerates
damage caused by a "nuclear incident directly due to an act of war,
hostilities, civil war or insurrection." 96
As is true of both the Rome Convention of 1952 and the Paris
Nuclear Liability Convention, this Convention excludes such tradi-
tional exonerations as unforeseeable act of a third party and force
majeure or act of God.
D. The Vienna Nuclear Liability Convention of 196397
This agreement also espouses the principle of strict liability (Article
IV(l)).9 The Official Records of the agreement disclose that such
a principle was employed because the activities covered by the Con-
vention were inherently of a hazardous nature, a contrary principle
90 ORGANIZATION FOR EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION, CONVENTION ON THIRD PARTY
LIABILITY IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 57 (1960).
91 Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, Brussels, May 25,
1962, reprinted in 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 268 (1963).
92 Konz, The 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear
Ships, 57 Aid. J. INT'L L. 100 (1963).
93 M. MCDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & I. VLAsIO, supra note 58, at 613.
94 57 AM. J. INT'L L. at 269.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 272.
97 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna, May 21, 1963,
reprinted in 2 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALs 727 (1963).
98 Id. at 733.
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would impose too heavy a burden on the claimant, and the factual
issues concerning fault would present questions of so technical and
intricate a nature that courts might find them insoluble.0 9 Further-
more, the rule was adopted in the interests of establishing legal
certainty by the use of a simple and uniform rule.1'0
This same principle of legal simplicity called for the avoidance
of some of the orthodox exonerations. Also, according to the Official
Records, few exonerations were allowed because precautions could be
taken by the operators, whereas potential victims would have no way
of protecting themselves. 101 Accordingly, the principle of strict liabil-
ity was not subjected to the classic exoneration for tortious acts, force
majeure, acts of God or intervening acts of third persons, whether or
not such acts were reasonable, foreseeable and avoidable. 0 2
Article IV(3)(a) provides that no liability shall apply if the dam-
age was "directly due to an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war
or insurrection."'0 3 Moreover, article IV(3)(b) establishes as an exon-
eration "a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character." 104
In addition, article IV(2) exonerates damage resulting from "the
gross negligence of the person suffering the damage or from an act or
omission of such person done with intent to cause damage,"' °5 if the
law of the forum so provides. The Official Records indicate, however,
that the framers did not think of this as an exoneration established
directly under the agreement, but rather as one which might be al-
lowed by local law.108 Referring to the issue of contributory negli-
gence, the framers stated that,
In view of the great differences existing as to the concept and scope
of these special defences it was not considered advisable or desir-
able to establish uniform international rules in this field but to
permit the application of national legal concepts. 0 7
The exoneration for "a grave natural disaster of an exceptional
character" was earlier employed, as noted above, in the Paris Nuclear
Liability Convention. The understanding of the United States repre-
sentative to the Vienna Convention was that "' grave natural disaster'
99 INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, CIVIL LIABILITY FOR NucLEAR DAMAGE
76 (IAEA Legal Series No. 2 1964).
'00 Id.
'0' Id. at 77.
102 Id.
103 2 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 734.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 753.
106 IAEA, supra note 99, at 76, 77.
'07 Id. at 77.
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had the meaning of some catastrophic and unforeseeable event as given
to it in paragraph 48 of the Expos6 des motifs in the Paris Conven-
tion."108 One illustration of a grave natural disaster is an earthquake
of exceptional magnitude. 109
The trends underlying the exoneration provisions of the Rome
Convention and the nuclear liability conventions might be outlined
as follows:
1. A common objective of all the agreements is to provide ade-
quate financial protection to innocent persons who might suffer per-
sonal or property damage as a result of an extrahazardous activity.
2. As articulated in the records of the Vienna Convention, the in-
terests of the party suffering the damage are best served by the imple-
mentation of a legally simple liability rule and the avoidance of fac-
tually complex exonerations.
3. To this end, all four conventions have eschewed such tradi-
tional exonerations as act of God, force majeure, and intervening acts
of third persons. In this regard, one might fairly conclude that the sin-
gle-mindedness with which Rome Convention delegates rejected many
of the orthodox exonerations was a characteristic common to the fram-
ers of all four conventions.
4. The exoneration for a grave natural disaster of an exceptional
character, which is found in both the Paris and Vienna Nuclear Lia-
bility Treaties, is not the same as the traditional exoneration of force
majeure or act of God. This exoneration requires a catastrophic disas-
ter which is totally unforeseeable.
5. One must bear in mind that all four conventions impose liabil-
ity upon the private sector as well as upon nations. To protect private
enterprise, the conventions exonerated damage resulting from armed
conflict, hostilities, or insurrection because it was felt that the nations
as a whole should be responsible for the cost of such harm. It follows
that if nation-states were the sole subjects of these conventions, this
exoneration might not have been obtained. Thus, in regard to agree-
ments which subject nation-states to liability, such as the prospective
space agreement, this particular exoneration might be inapposite.
6. Three of the four conventions recognized that negligence, or
wrongful act or omission or an act or omission done with intent to
cause damage on the part of the claimant should wholly or partially
serve as an exoneration from strict liability.
108 Id. at 146.
109 Id.
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IV
CURRENT PROPOSALS BEFORE THE LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF
OUTER SPACE
In May, 1962 the United States placed before the delegates of the
Legal Subcommittee a draft convention on liability for damage caused
by space vehicle accidents. 110 Subsequently, the Belgian"1 and Hun-
garian" 2 delegations also introduced draft agreements. Although the
drafts have been discussed and subjected to revision for nearly six
years, no agreement has been reached. Fortunately, recent events have
dispelled pessimistic auguries and there is good reason for optimism.
On the 14th and 15th of December, 1967, the Legal Subcommit-
tee convened in special session and promulgated a final agreement on
assistance to and return of personnel and space vehicles. 113 This is im-
portant because such an agreement has always been closely tied to an
agreement on space liability. In the same report to the Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the Legal Subcommittee recognized
the necessity of quickly reaching an agreement on liability. The report
stated that the Subcommittee
should expedite its work on the equally important and urgent
matter of the preparation of a draft agreement on liability ... so as
to conclude its preparation not later than the beginning of the
twenty-third session of the General Assembly [to convene in
September, 1968] and to submit it to that session.114
In addition to this pledge of action it is also heartening to note
that the Legal Subcommittee has already agreed on the applicability
of the principle of strict liability to damage caused by space objects.
The Legal Subcommittee has stated that "[trhe Launching ... State
should be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused on
the surface of the Earth and to aircraft in flight."115 Although there
has never been any serious disagreement with the application of this
principle, its articulation is noteworthy because it lays a cornerstone
for and marks progress toward a final, overall agreement. 116
11o U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.4 (1962).
Ill U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.7/Rev. I, found in A/AC.105/21 Annex II at 18 (1964).
li2 U.N. Doc. A/AC.I05/C.2fL.IO (1964).
113 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/48 (1967).
114 Id. at 2. See U.N. Doc. A/L.544 (1967).
115 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/37 at 6 (1967).
116 It is also noteworthy that Article VII of the recently ratified Outer Space Treaty,
done January 27, 1967, art. XII, - U.S.T. -, TI.A.S. No. 6347, addresses itself to the
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It is helpful to sketch briefly the evolution of the exoneration
provisions of each of the three drafts. The original Belgian draft pro-
vided that the culpa lata of the damaged party should be taken into ac-
count in determining liability. Specifically, article V of the draft read:
The extent of the liability for compensation shall be determined in
accordance with the provisions of the national law of the person
injured, taking into account his culpa lata if any.
Culpa lata shall be understood to mean any act or omission
perpetrated either with intent to cause damage or rashly and in full
knowledge that damage will probably result.117
Subsequently, this provision was amended to state that '[]iability
for compensation shall cease to exist in the event of culpa lata on the
part of the applicant state.""u 8 The term culpa lata was later deleted
entirely from the Belgian draft in favor of the term "wilful miscon-
duct."1 19 Thus, the exoneration provision came to read:
Liability for compensation shall cease to exist in the event of
wilful misconduct on the part of the applicant State.
"Wilful misconduct" shall be understood to mean any act or
omission perpetrated either with intent to cause damage or rashly
and in full knowledge that damage will probably result.120
Additional revision has resulted in the present Belgian proposal:
If the damage suffered results either wholly or partially from an
act or omission on the part of the Applicant State or of natural
or juridical persons that it represents and such act or omission has
been committed, either with intent to cause damage or rashly and
in full knowledge that damage will probably result, the liability of
the Launching State to pay compensation under this Convention
shall, to that extent, be wholly or partially extinguished.121
An early United States proposal exonerated launching states from
liability when the damage was caused by the "gross negligence" of the
injured party. Article III of the United States draft provided that
"gross negligence on the part of the presenting State or persons whom
it represents shall, as appropriate, diminish or expunge any obligation
to pay compensation."' 22 The term "gross negligence" was not defined.
general principle of international liability. However, it is debatable whether this provision
does anything more than acknowledge that diplomatic channels should remain open to
space liability claims.
117 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.7 (1964).
118 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.7/Rev. I, found in A/AC.105/21 Annex II at 23 (1964).
119 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.7/Rev. 2/Corr. 2, found in A/AC.105/21 Annex II at 27
(1964).
120 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.7/Rev. 2 and Corr. 1, 2 and 3 (1964).
121 U.N. Doc. A/AC.l05/C.2/L.7/Rev. 3, found in A/AC.105/37 Annex II at 1 (1967).
122 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C2/L.8 (1964).
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Dissatisfaction with the term gross negligence, on the ground that
it was ambiguous and subject to no internationally singular interpreta-
tion, was voiced in the Legal Subcommittee. 123 In response to this crit-
icism, the United States substantially revised the exoneration provi-
sion to state:
'If the damage suffered results either wholly or partially from a
wilful or reckless act of omission on the part of the Presenting
State, or of natural or juridical persons that it represents, the
liability of the Launching State to pay compensation ... shall, to
that extent, be wholly or partially extinguished.124
The Hungarian delegation has steadfastly adhered to its initial
proposal on exonerations. The Hungarian draft bars all exonerations
where the damage resulted from an unlawful space activity. On the
other hand, if the space activity is not unlawful, certain exonerations
are available. Article III of the Hungarian draft provides that:
... [E]xempdon from liability may be granted only insofar as the
State liable produces evidence that the damage has resulted from
natural disaster or from a wilful act or from gross negligence of the
[State] suffering the damage.125
Conceptually, there is considerable common ground among the
exoneration proposals. Leaving aside for the moment the Hungarian
proposal barring all exonerations when damage results from an un-
lawful space activity, only two types of exonerations have been pro-
posed: (1) natural disaster; and (2) wilful or gross misconduct.
The exoneration for natural disaster finds expression only in the
Hungarian draft. The Hungarian representative has advised the Legal
Subcommittee that natural disaster has the same connotation as vis
major or force majeure.u6 Even among its sponsors, this exoneration
has received rather unenthusiastic support. The Soviet Union, in sup-
porting the Hungarian draft, has somewhat weakly maintained that it
was worthy of adoption simply because it has in part been employed
in domestic and international law.127 In this connection, it has been
erroneously maintained that the exoneration finds precedent in the
Vienna Nuclear Liability Convention. 28
123 Dembling & Arons, supra note 19, at 352.
124 U.N. Doc. AfAC.1O5/C.2[L.19, found in A/AC.105/37 Annex II at 7 (1967).
125 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.1O/Rev. 1, found in A/AC.105/37 Annex II at 14 (1964).
120 See U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/37 Annex II at 3 (1967). U.N. Doc. A/AC.105fC.2/SR.48
at 12 (1965) [hereinafter summary reports will be cited as SR.]
127 SR.50 at 5. On the other hand, the Hungarian representative said that he could
see the cogency of the argument that "it was natural for the risk of force majeure to be
borne by the entrepreneur." Id. at 7.
128 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/21/Add.2 at 57 (1964).
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The Hungarian delegation has also argued that a natural disaster,
such as a spacecraft being struck by lightning, would break the chain
of causation, releasing the launching state from liability. In such a
case, the Hungarian representative has maintained, it would be normal
to place the consequences on the shoulders of the victim.12 On the
other hand, the Hungarian delegation has conceded that this exonera-
tion would present difficult evidentiary problems.1 0
The prevailing view among the delegates is that there should be
no exoneration for natural disaster.131 It has been argued by the United
States representative that "[s]uch an exoneration would make a serious
inroad into the concept of absolute liability" and produce inequitable
results. 132 In the same vein, the Belgian, United Kingdom, and Austrian
representatives have contended that the risk of a natural disaster should
be borne by the launching state rather than by innocent persons on the
ground.1' In this connection, the Committee has been reminded that
the Rome Convention of 1952, a most relevant analogue, made no
allowance for natural disaster. 34
An exoneration for wilful misconduct on the part of the injured
party is found in all three proposals. There is also agreement that gross
or reckless misconduct should bar recovery, although in this connection
linguistic nuances must be ironed out. The Belgian term "rashly and
in full knowledge that damage will probably result" is equivalent to
"reckless act" in the United States draft.135 And, although there nor-
mally is a shade of difference between reckless misconduct and gross
misconduct,136 the United States use of the term "reckless act" is in-
tended to mean the same as "gross misconduct" in the Hungarian draft.
As noted earlier, the United States had also used the term gross
negligence in an earlier draft, but changed it in response to wide-
spread criticism. To clarify the United States position, the Subcom-
mittee was advised that the United States did not intend to depart from
the concept of gross negligence. According to the United States repre-
sentative, "the expression 'wilful or reckless act or omission' . . . did
not mean mere negligence, but was rather tantamount to 'gross
negligence.' ,137
129 SR.50 at 7.
130 Id.
131 See Dembling & Arons, supra note 19, at 361.
132 SR.50 at 6.
133 Id. at 5, 6, 8.
134 Id. at 5.
135 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/21/Add.2 at 58 (1964).
136 See W. PRossaaR supra note 22, § 34.
137 SR.50 at 6.
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In response to the claim that the term gross negligence is inter-
nationally ambiguous, 3 it has been argued that the term has often
been used in international agreements. Furthermore, it has been main-
tained that the term "reckless conduct" is at least equally ambiguous.13 9
To erase any ambiguity, it has been suggested that the term "reckless
act," as found in the United States proposal, be replaced by the Belgian
phrase "rashly and in full knowledge that damage will probably re-
sult."' 4 This appears to be a reasonable compromise. In short, the
slight semantic differences which remain do not appear irreconcilable.
A more concrete distinction between the United States, Belgian,
and Hungarian drafts is that although the former two provide for
partial exoneration in the case of wilful or reckless misconduct, the
latter does not. The United States representative to the Legal Subcom-
mittee said that this provision would apply to a case where the negli-
gence of the injured party was not the sole cause of the damage. In
this regard, he said that it would not be difficult to decide the degree
of liability which should be extinguished.' 4 ' Although the idea does
not appear in the Hungarian draft, it has not been met with any
strenuous objections. 42
A more serious difference of opinion exists with respect to the
Hungarian proposal that no exorferations obtain if the damage resulted
from an unlawful space activity. The term unlawful activity refers
to any activity that would violate a treaty or any principle of customary
international law. 43 It was also understood that the phrase meant "an
activity contrary to the peace."' 44
The communist nations of Eastern Europe appear to feel strongly
about the matter. According to the Soviet delegate, the provision is
of "fundamental importance."' 45 In the same vein, the Rumanian
representative said, "It was surely unthinkable that [in cases of an
unlawful space activity giving rise to an accident] . . . an innocent
State suffering damage should bear any part of the burden."' 46 It was
13S See H. DaloN, supra note 24, at 197-207. Drion states that the term gross negli-
gence is interpreted differently by many nations and that the term fails to draw a line
between the various forms of negligence.
139 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/21[Add.2 at 58-59 (1964).
140 Id. at 58.
141 SR.50 at 6.
142 Dembling & Arons, supra note 19, at 361.
'43 SR.50 at 11.
144 Id. at 10.
145 Id. at 11.
146 Id. at 9.
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generally understood that such a provision has been deemed essential
for political reasons. 47
Those opposed to the provision have criticized it because of its
ambiguity.148 The United States representative has stated that the
United States draft "deliberately . . . avoided such sweeping gen-
eralities as 'unlawful activity in outer space . . .' in order to keep the
principle of absolute liability as comprehensive and simple as possi-
ble.' 149 The Canadian and Mexican representatives opposed the mea-
sure on the ground that the Convention was concerned with absolute
liability in the context of the peaceful uses of outer space, and the
Hungarian proposal fell outside that ambit'8 0 In this regard the
United States representative concurred.1 1
Despite the differences of opinion on the Hungarian proposal,
highly qualified commentators believe that this should not prevent
agreement on an article on exonerations from liability.15?
In summary, the three exoneration proposals show marked simi-
larities. All state that if the damage has resulted from wilful misconduct
or gross or reckless misconduct on the part of the claimant, the launch-
ing state will be exonerated from liability. All three drafts appear to
contemplate exoneration for the same type of misconduct on the part
of the claimant; the suggestion that the semantics problem be resolved
by combining the phraseology of the United States and Belgian drafts
is worthy of further study. In addition, both Belgium and the United
States agree (and no state strongly disagrees) that exoneration in such
cases may be partial.
The Hungarian proposal urging an exoneration for natural dis-
aster has not been forcefully supported. The consensus among the dele-
gates is that such a provision would inequitably place the risk of natural
disaster on the innocent victim rather than on the launching state where
it properly belongs. As a practical matter, even the Hungarian dele-
gation has conceded that such an exoneration might give rise to insol-
uble evidentiary problems. In short, it is widely believed that an exon-
eration for natural disaster is not desirable. The Hungarian proposal
barring all exonerations for unlawful space activity appears to have
strong support among the Communist delegates. Because of the polit-
147 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/21/Add.2 at 60 (1964).
148 See, e.g., SR.50 at 13.
149 SR.50 at 4, 5.
150 Id. at 10, 11.
151 Id. at 13.
182 Dembling & Arons, supra note 19, at 362.
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ical overtones, division on this matter presents a most serious, but not
insurmountable, obstacle to agreement.
In brief, the similarities in the three proposals outweigh any
serious differences, and agreement on an exoneration article appears
to be near.
CONCLUSION
Any study of the subject of exonerations from liability under an
international agreement on liability for damage caused by space vehi-
cles must not lose sight of the basic objectives that such an agreement
is designed to achieve. One paramount objective of the proposed agree-
ment relates to the principle of humanitarianism. This objective is,
of course, to minimize the destruction of human values by providing
adequate financial protection to innocent third persons who by chance
fall victim to a space vehicle accident.
A second objective is to establish a simple, expeditious, and equi-
table method of settling international claims based on damage caused
by man-made space objects. This goal not only enforces the paramount
objective of humanitarianism but also serves the interests of both the
space powers and the international community by reducing the possi-
bility of international disputes.
Any exoneration that shifts the risk of damage from the nation that
launched the object and whose economic resources can better with-
stand the loss caused by the object to the hapless victim should be based
on very strong reasons. Likewise, any provision pertaining to exonera-
tions that encumbers or obfuscates the agreement with matters that may
be difficult to prove or to understand should be avoided.
It is submitted that the only exoneration from liability should be
for wilful or reckless misconduct on the part of the claimant. Such an
exoneration might read:
If the damage suffered results either wholly or partially from an
act or omission on the part of the Presenting State, or of natural
or juridical persons that it represents, and such an act or omission
has been committed either (1) wilfully or (2) recklessly with knowl-
edge that damage will probably result, the liability of the Launch-
ing State to pay compensation under this Convention shall, to
that extent, be wholly or partially extinguished.
When the United States and the Soviet Union find it in their long-
range interests to consummate an agreement on space vehicle liability,
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legdl tchicalitieS and cufetit differefices of opihioi With respect to
exoneration will not stand in their way. When agreement is reached,
the exoatifaon article should be in accord with the sitnple, expeditious
and eqdiitable scherie bf the overall agreement.
